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Abstract Skeptical invariantism isn’t a popular view about the semantics of 
knowledge attributions. But what, exactly, is wrong with it? The basic problem is 
that it seems to run foul of the fact that we know quite a lot of things. I agree that 
it is a key desideratum for an account of knowledge that it accommodate the fact 
that we know a lot of things. But what sorts of things should a plausible theory of 
knowledge say that we know? In this paper I sketch an answer to this question and 
then apply it to skeptical invariantism. I start by distinguishing between a “radical” 
skeptical invariantist position (on which the standards for knowing are so high that 
we rarely if ever satisfy them) and a more “moderate” skeptical invariantist position 
(on which the standards are very hard, but not impossible, to satisfy). I then argue 
that, while radical forms of skeptical invariantism are clearly not going to do a 
good job of satisfying the key desideratum, more moderate forms can do quite well 
with respect to it. In particular, I argue the version of moderate skeptical 
invariantism defended by Davide Fassio can plausibly satisfy it. 
0. Introductory Remarks 
Skepticism is not a popular view in epistemology. Most epistemologists reject it.1 
Why? Some reject it because they view the arguments for it as based on a mistake 
(Williams 1991; Wright 1991; Sosa 2009). Others reject it for the simple reason that 
they think we know lots of things (Moore 1939; Pritchard 2002; Sosa 1999). These 
epistemologists take it as a key desideratum on an account of knowledge that it fits 
with the (pre-theoretic?) intuition that we know a lot of things. Because skepticism, 
by definition, cannot accommodate this desideratum, it is to be rejected. 
I think that something like this desideratum is right. We do know certain things, 
and any view of knowledge which says we don’t is therefore to be rejected. This 
might not sound like a promising starting point for an exploration of skeptical 
invariantism. This paper looks like it is over before it has started. 
But this would be too hasty for three reasons. The first is that the desideratum is 
vague. Which things do we know? It makes no sense to require an account of 
knowledge to vindicate every intuition someone might have about the extension of 
 
1 Exceptions include Fumerton (1995), Stroud (1984) and Unger (1975). 
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the concept of knowledge. We need to come up with, and defend, a list of things 
we should want an account of knowledge to say we know. 
Second, I am open to revisionary accounts of knowledge (Craig 1990; Fassio and 
McKenna 2015; Haslanger 1999; Kusch and McKenna forthcoming). An account 
of knowledge that is theoretically attractive may also revise certain aspects of our 
ordinary understanding of knowledge, such as how much of it we actually have. 
But there has to be a trade-off here: the more revisionary an account is, the greater 
the theoretical benefits must be (Fassio and McKenna 2015).2 
Third, the label “skeptical invariantism” denotes a family of views (Cappelen 2005; 
Davis 2007; Fassio forthcoming; Kyriacou 2017; Levin 2008). Some of these views 
are “radical” in that they hold that we know very little, if anything. But others are 
more “moderate” in that they merely hold that we know significantly less than we 
ordinarily take ourselves to know. You might hold that we know a lot less than we 
think we do, yet still hold that we know a fair bit.  
Putting all this together, it should be clear that, properly understood, the key 
desideratum need not rule out skeptical invariantist accounts of knowledge from 
the outset. But is there a version of skeptical invariantism that can actually 
accommodate it? This is my question in this paper.  
Here is the plan. In the first part I distinguish between “radical” and “moderate” 
skeptical invariantism, and identify specific versions of each view that I focus on in 
the rest of the paper.  
In the second part I say more about what I take the core cases of knowledge to be. 
Over and above the sorts of cases you might expect—e.g. simple perceptual beliefs 
formed in normal conditions, knowledge of a priori, analytic or necessary truths—I 
argue we should follow the naturalised epistemologist and look to science to 
identify core cases of knowledge. I focus on one item of scientific knowledge in 
particular: we know that global temperatures are rising. 
In the third part I investigate whether skeptical invariantism can accommodate the 
core cases identified in the second part. I focus on Davide Fassio’s (forthcoming) 
moderate skeptical invariantism and investigate how it fairs with the key 
 
2 Michael Hannon suggested that it is unclear whether radical skepticism really is 
revisionary, because the radical skeptic generally does not think we should change 
our ordinary practice of knowledge ascriptions (see e.g. Unger (1975). This is a fair 
point, but it does seem to require a workable pragmatic account of knowledge 
ascriptions. For discussion of skeptical invariantism and the pragmatics of 
knowledge ascriptions see Cappelen (2005), Davis (2007), (DeRose 2017), Dinges 
(2016) and Kyriacou (2017).  
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desideratum. While this investigation raises several issues, I argue that his view can 
go some way towards accommodating the cases, and so satisfying the desideratum. 
This by no means constitutes a full defence of moderate skeptical invariantism. But 
it does show that it is a view well worth taking seriously. Maybe we really do know 
a lot less than we ordinarily take ourselves to know. 
1. Skeptical Invariantism 
Since the late 1980s there has been much debate in epistemology about the 
semantics of knowledge ascriptions—utterances of sentences including the word 
“knows” and its cognates. The crucial question has been: is the word “knows” (and 
its cognates) context-sensitive, in the same way that indexicals (“I”, “here”) or 
gradable adjectives (“tall”, “heavy”) are context-sensitive? That is, do uses of the 
word “knows” refer to different relations in different contexts of utterance? The 
“invariantist” holds that they refer to the same relation in all contexts of utterance: 
the knowledge relation (Brown 2006; Hazlett 2009; Rysiew 2001). In contrast, the 
“contextualist” holds that they refer to different relations in different contexts of 
utterance (DeRose 1992; Cohen 1986; Lewis 1996). 
While more could be said about the differences between invariantism and 
contextualism, we can put contextualism to one side and focus on invariantism. 
There are two important distinctions to draw between different forms of 
invariantism. The first is between “traditional” and “interest-relative” invariantism. 
The traditional invariantist and the interest-relative invariantist agree that the word 
“knows” and its cognates is context-insensitive: uses of it express the same relation 
irrespective of context. They differ over the nature of that relation. For the 
traditional invariantist, whether someone knows something depends on purely 
epistemic or truth-connected factors, such as the strength of their evidence (Brown 
2008; Gerken 2017; Reed 2010). For the interest-relative invariantist, whether 
someone knows depends on a combination of epistemic and “practical” factors, 
such as the costs of being wrong or “stakes” (Fantl and McGrath 2009; Hawthorne 
2004; Stanley 2005). 
Imagine Catriona and Laurie both have the same evidence that the next stop is 
South Parkway, and they both believe that the next stop is South Parkway on the 
basis of this evidence. For Catriona it doesn’t matter if she is wrong: she doesn’t 
need to get off at South Parkway, as she can equally well get off at the next stop. In 
contrast, for Laurie it is absolutely imperative that she not get this wrong. For the 
traditional invariantist, this difference in what is “at stake” is irrelevant: either the 
evidence is sufficient for them both to know, or it isn’t. For the interest-relative 
invariantist, the difference in stakes matters. It may be that the evidence is 
sufficient for Catriona to know given how little it would matter if she were wrong, 




The second distinction is between “skeptical” and “moderate” invariantism. The 
invariantist holds that the word “knows” is univocal: it expresses the same relation 
in all contexts of utterance. But how (to put it roughly) stringent is this relation? 
That is, how high are the standards for knowledge? The moderate invariantist says 
that the standards are relatively modest.3 They are high enough to draw a 
distinction between, say, merely truly believing that it is raining and knowing that it 
is raining. But they are sufficiently low that we count as knowing an awful lot. The 
skeptical invariantist says that the standards are considerably higher—high enough 
that we count as knowing a lot less than the moderate invariantist thinks we do 
(Cappelen 2005; Davis 2007; Fassio forthcoming; Kyriacou 2017; Levin 2008). 
With these distinctions in hand, we can now focus on skeptical invariantism. I start 
with two preliminaries. First, as I use the label, skeptical invariantism is neutral 
between traditional and interest-relative invariantism.4 That is, the skeptical 
invariantist might hold that knowledge depends purely on epistemic factors, but 
she might also allow that knowledge depends partly on pragmatic factors.  
Second, skeptical invariantism denotes a family of positions, ranging from a view 
on which the standards for knowledge are very high indeed, so high that we rarely 
if ever meet them, to views on which the standards for knowledge are more 
stringent than the moderate invariantist would allow, but not so high that we can’t 
sometimes meet them. We can distinguish between “radical” and “moderate” 
skeptical invariantism. But these are perhaps best seen as labels for two contrasting 
tendencies, rather than for distinct views: the radical skeptical invariantist tends to 
insist that the standards for knowledge are about as high as they could be, whereas 
the moderate skeptical invariantist tends to insist that the standards are very high, 
but not so high as the radical skeptical invariantist insists they are. 
In the rest of the paper it will be helpful to have concrete examples of radical and 
moderate skeptical invariantist positions to hand. I focus on the radical skeptical 
invariantism defended by Christos Kyriacou (2017) and the moderate skeptical 
invariantism defended by Davide Fassio (forthcoming), though for reasons that 
 
3 The label “moderate invariantism” is from Hawthorne (2004). All of the 
invariantists cited above are moderate in Hawthorne’s sense. 
4 I make this stipulation because I don’t want to get embroiled in discussion about 
whether the moderate skeptical invariantist view I go on to consider (Fassio 
forthcoming) is really a version of traditional invariantism. It agrees with the 
traditional invariantist that, if a subject knows in a low stakes case, then she knows 
in the corresponding high stakes case. But it characterises knowledge in terms of a 
notion (practical certainty) that looks a little pragmatic. Part of the issue here is that 
the terms “epistemic” and “pragmatic” are not usually clearly defined and 
distinguished. For discussion see Hannon (2020). 
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will become clear below I focus more on Fassio’s moderate skeptical invariantism 
than Kyriacou’s radical skeptical invariantism. 
Kyriacou defends what he calls “bifurcated skeptical invariantism”. His skeptical 
invariantism is “bifurcated” because he holds that there are two related but distinct 
concepts of knowledge, both of which are operative, but in different contexts. 
These are (put roughly) a concept of knowledge as fallible and a concept of 
knowledge as infallible. These concepts are related in that they hold that 
knowledge requires justification. But they are distinct in that they take different 
views of the nature of justification. In order to have fallible knowledge, one must 
merely believe on the basis of strong but defeasible justification. In contrast, in 
order to have infallible knowledge, one must believe on the basis of a justification 
that entails the truth of one’s belief.5 
Kyriacou’s view is that, so far as the semantics of “knowledge” and knowledge 
ascriptions is concerned, to say that someone “knows” something is to say that 
they have infallible knowledge. Thus, many of our knowledge ascriptions—indeed, 
all of the ones where the subject lacks infallible justification—are, strictly speaking, 
false.6 But, so far as the pragmatics of “knowledge” and knowledge ascriptions is 
concerned, we often use them to communicate that subjects have fallible 
knowledge. Because subjects often do have fallible knowledge—they often believe 
on the basis of fallible justification—our knowledge ascriptions often pragmatically 
convey truths, even though they are largely, strictly speaking, false. 
Now turning to Fassio, there are two crucial components of his view: 
[A] subject knows p only if she is practically certain that p, where practical 
certainty can be defined as the confidence a rational subject would have to have 
for her to believe that p and act on p no matter the stakes on being right about 
whether p (forthcoming, 3). 
S is practically certain that p if and only if [if S were rationally responsive to 
stakes, S would maintain a degree of confidence sufficient to believe that p and 
act on p no matter how much turned on p] (forthcoming, 5). 
 
5 In contemporary epistemology infallibilism is enjoying a renaissance, in large part 
due to Williamson (2000). Williamson identifies one’s evidence with one’s 
knowledge so, when you know that p, you have evidence which entails p (i.e. your 
knowledge that p). Kyriacou thinks his view entails that we know little, if anything, 
so he clearly must reject Williamsonian infallibilism. More generally, he must reject 
any view on which our evidence goes beyond our experiences and includes claims 
about the external world. For discussion of Williamsonian infallibilism see Brown 
(2018). 
6 Recall from fn. 5 that I am ignoring Williamsonian infallibilism.  
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The thought is that you know that p only if you are practically certain that p, and 
you are practically certain that p iff you are sufficiently confident that p such that, 
no matter the stakes, the rational response to them would be to still believe that p 
and act on p. Note that Fassio does not “build it in” to his view that we know 
more than the radical skeptical invariantist would allow, but less than the moderate 
invariantist would allow.7 Rather, he provides us with a condition on knowledge 
(practical certainty), which he argues is easier to meet than the sort of condition a 
radical skeptical invariantist would endorse, but harder to meet than the sort of 
condition a moderate invariantist would endorse.  
To see how his “practical certainty condition” works, consider one of the cases 
above. Recall that Catriona and Laurie had the same evidence that the next stop is 
South Parkway, and they both believed that the next stop is South Parkway on the 
basis of this evidence. To determine whether either of them have knowledge we 
need to ask if they are practically certain that the next stop is South Parkway, and 
they are practically certain that the next stop is South Parkway if and only if, if they 
rationally responded to the stakes, they would be confident enough to believe and 
act on the proposition that the next stop is South Parkway no matter the stakes.8  
Whether this condition is met is going to depend on the strength of the evidence. 
We can distinguish three cases. First, let’s imagine it is relatively flimsy: they both 
glanced at the list of stops on the platform before they boarded the train, and they 
seem to recall that South Parkway was on it. In this case, it is clear that the 
condition will not be met. Imagine a high stakes situation. In such a situation, if 
they rationally responded to the stakes, they would be insufficiently confident to 
believe that the train stops at South Parkway, or to act on this basis. So they aren’t 
practically certain. 
Second, let’s imagine it is considerably stronger, but still far from conclusive: they 
have taken this train before, and it usually stops at South Parkway. In this case, it is 
(or at least Fassio thinks it is) clear that the condition will also not be met. That is, 
 
7 Compare: a safety theorist like Sosa (2007) does not built it into his account that 
we know anything, but rather proposes a particular condition on knowledge 
(safety), then argues that many of our beliefs are safe in his sense. 
8 On Fassio’s view, what matters is what the rational response to the stakes would 
be, not what some subject’s actual response would be. You might ask: what is it to 
rationally respond to the stakes? For Fassio’s discussion of this see Section 1 of his 
paper. But the rationale for the rationality requirement is that Fassio wants to avoid 
situations where a subject would remain confident enough to believe something, or 
act on the basis of it, no matter the stakes because they are habitually over-
confident. His thought is that the over-confident subject would not be rationally 
responding to the stakes, 
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we can imagine a situation where the stakes are high enough that, if they were to 
rationally respond to them, they would be insufficiently confident to believe that 
the train stops at South Parkway, or to act on this basis. So they aren’t practically 
certain here either.  
Finally, let’s imagine it is very strong: they just heard an announcement from the 
driver saying the next stop is South Parkway, all the signs say the next stop is South 
Parkway, they recognise that they are approaching South Parkway, the train is 
slowing down, and so on. Fassio’s view is that, in this case, the condition is met. 
That is, he thinks that, no matter how high we imagine the stakes being, it remains 
the case that, if they were to rationally respond to them, they would be confident 
enough to believe that the train stops at South Parkway, and to act on this basis. So 
they are practically certain.  
These three cases not only illustrate how the practical certainty condition works; 
they also illustrate the “moderate” and “skeptical” aspects of Fassio’s view. The 
view is moderate in that, in the third case, there plausibly is knowledge. The view is 
skeptical in that, in the second case, there isn’t. Thus, they distinguish Fassio’s view 
from moderate invariantism (which would hold there is knowledge in the second 
case), and radical skeptical invariantism (which would deny there is knowledge in 
the third case). 
This completes my overview of skeptical invariantism. I am now going to consider 
the extent of our knowledge, and whether there is a skeptical invariantist position 
that can plausibly accommodate the things we should take ourselves to know. 
2. Articulating the Key Desideratum 
How much do we know? And, more importantly for our purposes, how much 
does a theory of knowledge need to say we know in order to be plausible? In this 
section I want to make two suggestions. The first—which I won’t spend much 
time on—is that the debate about invariantism and the semantics of knowledge 
ascriptions tends to implicitly assume an implausible answer to the second of these 
questions. The second—which I will spend a little more time on—is that we can 
draw up a list of several classes of beliefs that we should expect a theory of 
knowledge to vindicate as cases of knowledge. I should say from the outset that I 
make no claim to the effect that my list is complete. It may be there are classes of 
beliefs that a theory of knowledge should vindicate that are not on my list, and I 
won’t discuss the extent to which the skeptical invariantist can accommodate them. 
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But my aim in this paper is to develop a partial, not a full, defence of (moderate) 
skeptical invariantism.9 
Let’s start with the first suggestion. In the debate about knowledge ascriptions it 
often seems to be taken as obvious that the subjects in the “low stakes” version of 
DeRose’s bank cases have knowledge. This case goes like this: 
Low: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They 
plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit a check. It’s not important 
that they do so, as they have no impending bills. But, as they drive past the 
bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long. Realising that it isn't very 
important that the check is deposited right away, Hannah says, “I know that the 
bank will be open tomorrow. I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday 
morning. So we can deposit our check tomorrow morning”.10 
The general assumption seems to be that, clearly, Hannah speaks truly when she 
says that she knows the bank will be open on Saturday. Some views seek to 
vindicate this assumption by complicating it: for the contextualist, the subjects in 
these cases can truly be said to “know” in some contexts but not others, and for 
the interest-relative invariantist, they know in part because the stakes are low. 
Other views seek to vindicate it in a more straightforward manner (e.g. traditional 
moderate invariantism). The problem for the skeptical invariantist (whether radical 
or moderate) is meant to be that they deny that the subjects in these cases have 
knowledge irrespective of the stakes, and no matter in what context one ascribes 
knowledge to them. But, for this to be a problem, we need to be justified in 
treating low stakes bank cases as core or non-negotiable cases of knowledge, and 
this strikes me as highly implausible. Note: my claim is not that Hannah does not 
know in this case. Maybe she does. It may well be that our best account of 
knowledge rules that the subjects in bank cases have knowledge. That doesn’t 
mean that we should build it into our theorising about knowledge that an 
acceptable account of knowledge has to have this result (cf. Dinges 2016) 
Turning to the second suggestion, we can start with what Fassio says we can know 
according to his moderate skeptical invariantism. Fassio says: 
 
9 In personal correspondence Fassio told me that he thinks his account can also 
accommodate the following classes of knowledge: inferential knowledge (where 
inference need not be deductive), knowledge about what is probable or will be the 
case conditional on other events, modal knowledge, aesthetic knowledge, historical 
knowledge, medical knowledge and technical knowledge. If he is right about this, 
then perhaps a full defence of moderate skeptical invariantism can be mounted. 
But I lack the space to deal with all these classes of knowledge here. 




MSI [moderate skeptical invariantism] allows that knowledge is compatible with 
absence of absolute certainty. One may be practically certain, and therefore in a 
position to know that p, even if one is not in a position to exclude some 
abstract error possibilities. While MSI excludes knowledge in Bank-like cases (a 
subject that is rational and aware of the high stakes will lack the confidence 
necessary to believe and act on the proposition that the bank is open on 
Saturday), all beliefs based on a rational degree of confidence that is ‘robust’ 
enough to survive any significant increase in the stakes are good candidates for 
knowledge (forthcoming, 9). 
But what beliefs are based on a rational degree of confidence robust enough to 
survive any increase in the stakes? Fassio is reluctant to list concrete examples, but 
he ventures the following: 
• His belief that the capital of Italy is Rome. 
• His belief (formed on a Monday) that tomorrow is Tuesday. 
• His belief that he ate spaghetti for lunch. 
• His belief that in December he bought presents for his family. 
• His belief that there are two oranges on the table. 
• Certain testimonial beliefs (e.g. Hannah’s belief that the next stop is South 
Parkway, based on being told by a ticket inspector a few minutes before). 
Rather than focus on concrete examples, I think a better approach is to focus on 
broad classes of beliefs which, on a plausible account of knowledge, we should be 
said to know. The claim is not that any particular individual has some piece of 
knowledge. Rather, the claim is that many subjects in certain sorts of situations 
know certain things. For instance: 
1. Beliefs about our immediate surroundings formed on the basis of 
perception in normal conditions (“there are two oranges on the table”). 
2. Very well supported memorial and testimonial beliefs (“I ate spaghetti for 
lunch”, “the next stop is South Parkway”). 
3. Beliefs in matters of fact that we generally take for granted, including facts 
about the future (“the capital of Italy is Rome”, “tomorrow is Tuesday”, 
“the sun will rise tomorrow”). 
In addition to these three classes of beliefs suggested by Fassio, I would like to add 
some more. Consider: 
4. Some introspective beliefs (e.g. “I am in pain right now”). 
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5. Beliefs in a priori/necessary/analytic truths (e.g. “all bachelors are 
unmarred”, “2+2=4”, “water is H2O”).11 
Finally, I want to add certain scientific beliefs. Now, I don’t think that an account 
of knowledge should show that we know all and everything that science takes us to 
know. Scientists may differ as to what we know, and it may be that some scientists 
take us to know that some hypothesis H is true whereas others take us to know 
that H is false. Rather, I think that, when it comes to hypotheses that are 
established with as much certainty as science can provide us with, an account of 
knowledge should allow that we do indeed know that these hypotheses are true. I 
want to focus on a particular example here: science, I take it, has shown with as 
much certainty as we could hope for that global temperatures are rising due to 
human activities. Of course, science hasn’t established that global warming is 
happening due to human activities with absolute certainty. But science doesn’t deal 
in absolute certainties.12 
I offer two reasons for including certain items of scientific knowledge in our key 
desideratum, the first of which is less theoretically loaded than the second. 
First, it would be more than a little odd to accept testimonial beliefs, like Catriona’s 
belief that the train stops at South Parkway, as core cases of knowledge, yet not to 
accept our belief that global warming is happening due to human activities as a 
core case. I don’t know about you, but insofar as the comparison makes sense, we 
have far more and far better evidence that human activities are causing global 
temperatures to rise than Catriona does that the next stop is South Parkway.13 
Similar points can, I think, be made about memorial beliefs, and perhaps some 
perceptual beliefs. 
 
11 On some views we can distinguish between a priori, necessary or analytic truths 
and on some views we can’t. For my purposes it doesn’t much matter where you 
stand on these issues. 
12 While it is hard to quantify the degree of certainty, we do know the degree of 
consensus among climate scientists that human activities are causing global 
warming, which is 97% (see Cook et al. 2016). Degree of consensus is, of course, a 
poor proxy for degree of certainty, but it is worth noting that such a high degree of 
consensus is unusual. 
13 Of course, I’m comparing a case of individual testimonial knowledge with group 
scientific knowledge, so there are some differences. If you like, replace talk of “us” 
knowing that global warming is happening due to human activities with talk of 
individual climate scientists knowing this. I still think it is right to say that an 
individual climate scientist has better evidence that climate change is happening 




One might object that what science has established is not that climate change is 
happening due to human activities, but rather that it is (very) likely that climate 
change is happening due to human activities, and so what we can be said to know 
is not that climate change is happening, but that it is (very) likely that it is.14 Of 
course, science does establish the likelihood claim. But why not also take it to 
establish the unqualified claim? If you agree that we have more and better evidence 
for some scientific hypotheses than we do for testimonial (and memorial and some 
perceptual) beliefs, then it would be odd to take science to only establish claims 
about probabilities, and yet to take it that we can come to know what the next stop 
is on the basis of testimony, rather than merely that it is (very) likely that the next 
stop is such-and-such.  
Second, a key insight from naturalised epistemology is that, when it comes to the 
traditional epistemological question of the extent of our knowledge, we should 
look to science to answer it (cf. Quine 1969). Now, you might object that there are 
things we clearly seem to know that have nothing to do with science. Take, for 
instance, simple perceptual knowledge or memorial knowledge. These forms of 
knowledge can be scientific, but they need not be. This point is fair so far as it goes 
but, first, you might respond that science can explain the mechanisms involved in 
producing perceptual and memorial knowledge and, second, this would only show 
that we can’t look to science to identify the full extent of our knowledge. 
I have identified six classes of things we want an account of knowledge to say we 
know: 
1. Beliefs about our immediate surroundings formed on the basis of 
perception in normal conditions. 
2. Very well supported memorial and testimonial beliefs. 
3. Beliefs in matters of fact that we generally take for granted. 
4. Some introspective beliefs. 
5. A priori/necessary/analytic truths. 
6. Some items of scientific knowledge (e.g. “global temperatures are rising due 
to human activities”). 
I now turn to seeing how skeptical invariantism, particularly moderate forms of it, 
does with respect to this desideratum. 
3. Assessing Skeptical Invariantism 
I have argued that it is a key desideratum on an account of knowledge that it 
accommodates certain core cases of knowledge. While for obvious reasons I will 
 
14 Thanks to Christos Kyriacou and Michael Hannon for pushing me to say 
something about this objection. 
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focus on moderate skeptical invariantism, I want to—albeit very briefly—say 
something about the basis on which I am dismissing radical forms of skeptical 
invariantism, and particularly Kyriacou’s bifurcated skeptical invariantism. 
I myself have no problem in principle with revisionary accounts, whether of 
knowledge or of anything else. A revisionary account of knowledge may be more 
theoretically attractive than its rivals, and this may provide ample reason for 
revising our ordinary understanding of knowledge, or of its extent (see Fassio and 
McKenna (2015). But I do think that there are certain constraints on any 
revisionary project. In Fassio and McKenna (2015) we argue for a “moderately 
conservative” revisionary methodology, according to which, the more revisionary 
an account of knowledge is, the higher the barrier to accepting it. Put simply, an 
account that radically revises our ordinary understanding of knowledge—for 
instance, by claiming that we know an awful lot less than we ordinarily take 
ourselves to know—would not just have to secure several theoretical benefits. It 
would have to secure far more theoretical benefits than any rival account.15 While 
Kyriacou claims some theoretical benefits for his radical skeptical invariantist 
account of knowledge (e.g. it can (dis)solve the Gettier problem, and it addresses 
Kripke’s dogmatism paradox), I don’t think he makes (or attempts to make) the 
case that it secures far more theoretical benefits than any rival account.  
While more could be said here, I now turn to my main question in this section: can 
Fassio’s moderate skeptical invariantism accommodate the core cases of 
knowledge identified in the previous section? While I won’t give an unqualified 
affirmative answer to this question, it is at least initially plausible that it can. 
We can start with perceptual, memorial and testimonial beliefs. Fassio spends some 
time arguing that we can be practically certain when it comes to some of our 
perceptual, memorial and testimonial beliefs. We can split his argument into two 
parts. First, he considers an objection which, if right, would show that none of our 
perceptual, memorial or testimonial beliefs could ever be practically certain.16 
Recall Catriona. Can she be practically certain that the next stop is South Parkway, 
on the basis of being told that it is by the ticket inspector a few moments before? 
Consider a context where Catriona is offered an extremely high stakes bet with the 
following pay-off structure. If Catriona is right that the next stop is South Parkway, 
she gets a penny. If Catriona is wrong about this, something terrible will happen to 
her—make this thing as terrible as you can imagine. Many think that, in such a 
 
15 This is perhaps where the defence of the justified true belief account of 
knowledge considered (though not endorsed) in Weatherson (2003) goes wrong. 
There are some theoretical benefits to holding on to the justified true belief account, 
but they are surely not sufficient to adequately defend it. 
16 For this sort of objection see Weatherson (2012). 
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context, if Catriona were to rationally respond to the stakes, she would not be 
confident enough that the next stop is South Parkway to take the bet. Indeed, the 
rational thing to do would be to decline to take the bet. 
Fassio’s response to this strikes me as right. He agrees that, in this sort of case, it 
would not be rational for Catriona to take the bet. But he denies that this poses a 
problem for his account of knowledge. Now, “bet cases” would be a problem if 
the reason why it would not be rational for Catriona to take the bet is that the 
stakes are so high. But, thinks Fassio, the reason why it would not be rational for 
Catriona to take the bet has nothing to do with the stakes. Put roughly, the thought 
is that bet cases raise certain factors to salience, and it is these factors that explain 
why it would not be rational for Catriona to take the bet. To make this point more 
persuasive, he considers two cases: 
Great Importance (GI): Mark is on a train going to Sterling. It is very important 
that Mark  be at the station soon because he is bringing a medicine to his sister 
Jane. If Mark cannot meet her at the station and give her the medicine, she is 
very likely to die. If he doesn’t get off the train at right station (e.g., he gets off 
at a different station), he will not be able to meet his sister on time. According 
to the route plan the next stop is Sterling. A ticket inspector passed in the coach 
a few minutes ago and announced that the next stop is Sterling. The train is 
approaching a station. Mark forms the outright belief that the train is 
approaching Sterling station, stands up and goes to the exit in order to get out 
High Bet (HB): Mark is on a train going to Sterling. As in GI, according to the 
route plan the next stop is Sterling. A ticket inspector passed in the coach a few 
minutes ago and announced that the next stop is Sterling. A man approaches 
him. He proposes a bet about whether the next station is Sterling: if it is, he will 
give Mark £10000, otherwise Mark will lose £10000. The train is approaching a 
station. Mark has the same evidence as in GI, but doesn’t feel confident enough 
to take the bet (forthcoming, 14). 
The thought is that it would be rational for Mark to believe that the next stop is 
Sterling, and to act on the basis of this belief, in GI, but it would not be rational 
for Mark to take the bet in HB. But the stakes are actually higher in GI than in HB 
(and, as Fassio says, if you don’t think they are, just make the stakes even higher in 
GI). So it can’t be stakes that are driving intuitions in bet cases. 
Now, this does not establish that our perceptual, memorial or testimonial beliefs 
are ever practically certain. This leads to the second part of Fassio’s argument. His 
basic strategy is to argue that there are examples of perceptual, memorial and 
testimonial beliefs of which we are practically certain. Take some of the examples 
considered above: the belief that there are two oranges on the table, formed in 
normal perceptual conditions; the belief that Rome is the capital of Italy; Catriona’s 
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belief that the next stop is South Parkway. I agree with Fassio that he can 
accommodate these sorts of cases. But how does this fare as an attempt to satisfy 
the key desideratum? 
The most Fassio can claim is that his account can accommodate some core cases 
of perceptual, memorial and testimonial knowledge (the cases discussed above). 
This is not to say that, on his account,  we have as much perceptual, memorial and 
testimonial knowledge as we would ordinarily assume. But recall my objection to 
Kyriacou’s radical skeptical invariantism: the more revisionary of our ordinary 
understanding a view is, the greater its theoretical benefits need to be. Because 
Kyriacou’s view is extremely revisionary of our ordinary understanding of the 
extent of knowledge, it needs to have far greater theoretical benefits than 
competitors. Because Fassio’s view is far less revisionary, it doesn’t need to have as 
many theoretical benefits. This of course is not to say that it has sufficient 
theoretical benefits. But the barrier to acceptance is considerably lower. 
How does Fassio’s view fare with introspective beliefs, or beliefs in a priori, 
analytic or necessary truths? Things are far simpler here. While he doesn’t consider 
such beliefs in much depth, one might think it is very plausible that we can be 
absolutely certain when it comes to beliefs in either of these classes. For Fassio, 
absolute certainty entails, but is not entailed by, practical certainty. So Fassio’s view 
does well here.  
Finally, we can consider the sixth and final class of beliefs I said an account of 
knowledge should accommodate: certain scientific beliefs, like the belief that 
climate change is caused by human activities. I am going to argue that it is plausible 
this belief is practically certain in Fassio’s sense, at least for some epistemic agents. 
Let’s imagine an epistemic agent, Ailsa, who has a keen amateur interest in climate 
science. For a layperson, she is very well informed about the scientific evidence 
that human activities are causing global warming. She has read some journal 
articles, knows all the most common climate skeptical arguments, and can explain, 
in some detail, where these arguments go wrong. She is also a passionate 
environmentalist. But her acceptance of the science on climate change isn’t 
dogmatic: she recognises that, while the basic hypothesis that humans are causing 
global warming is as established as any hypothesis could be, there are still a lot of 
unanswered questions and uncertainties. I would submit that Ailsa knows that 
human activities are causing global warming. So, the question is, is her belief is 
practically certain? 
For Ailsa’s belief to be practically certain it would have to be that, no matter what 
the stakes were, if she were rationally responsive to the stakes, she would remain 
confident enough to believe that human activities are causing global warming, and 
to act on this basis. Is this the case? At least initially, it might seem like the answer 
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is clear: yes! After all, you might think, the stakes are incredibly high: the survival of 
humankind may well depend on dealing with global warming. So, if we think Ailsa 
is rational in believing that human activities are causing global warming, and acting 
on this basis, in the scenario described above, then we presumably would think the 
same no matter the stakes. After all, how could they be higher?  
There are three issues. The first issue concerns what the stakes actually are here. 
Of course, in some sense, the stakes are clearly incredibly high: the survival of 
humankind may well depend on dealing with global warming. But, in the literature 
on interest-relative invariantism, when people talk about the stakes relating to a 
proposition, they generally mean the costs of being wrong in believing that 
proposition.17 Applying this here, what would matter would be the costs (for Ailsa) 
of being wrong in believing that human activities are causing global warming. It 
isn’t so clear that the costs (at least for Ailsa) of being wrong in believing this are 
particularly high.  
Perhaps this issue can be dealt with by slightly changing how we think about 
stakes. Instead of just considering the costs (for a subject) of being wrong in 
believing some proposition, we can also consider the costs (for that subject) of not 
being right.18 That is, we can also consider the costs of not believing something that 
is true. If we put things this way, it may become easier to see why the stakes are 
high for Ailsa: she presumably would think that the costs of not believing that 
human activities are causing global warming, when they in fact are doing so, are 
very high.  
The second issue is that, even if we think of the stakes in terms of the costs of not 
being right, it isn’t so clear that the stakes are high for Ailsa here. What bad 
consequences would follow if Ailsa didn’t believe that human activities were 
causing global warming? Of course, if lots of people don’t believe this, that might 
be bad for society, and detrimental to the long-term survival of the human race. 
But that’s different from it being bad for Ailsa.  
To address this issue, we need to further consider the way in which stakes are 
usually thought of in the literature. We can distinguish between the “perceived” 
and “actual” stakes for a subject. The perceived stakes are, roughly, what they take 
the costs of being wrong (and, we might add, of not being right) to be. The actual 
stakes are, roughly, what the consequences of being wrong will actually be for the 
subject. Some (e.g. Fassio) interpret stakes in the first way; others (Stanley 2005) in 
 
17 For discussion of the lack of clarity about what stakes are in this literature see 
Anderson (2015) and Anderson and Hawthorne (2019). 
18 For similar points see Crewe and Jenkins Ichikawa (forthcoming), Mueller 
(2017), Pace (2011) and Worsnip (2015). 
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the second. Applying this to Ailsa, it seems clear that the stakes are high in the first 
sense, but it is less clear that they are high in the second sense. 
Does this matter? It is important to note that, even though the notion of stakes 
may be difficult to apply in Ailsa’s case, it is not clear it makes a difference so far as 
practical certainty is concerned. Imagine you thought that, contrary to first 
impressions, Ailsa is actually not in a high stakes situation. Does that mean she 
isn’t practically certain? Well, she would only not be practically certain if there were 
a high stakes situation in which, if she were rationally responsive to the stakes, she 
would not remain confident enough to believe and act. While I have no argument 
that there couldn’t be such a situation, that is not to say that there actually is one. 
The third issue is whether what I have said about Ailsa is going to generalise. It 
clearly isn’t going to generalise in the sense that everyone can be said to know that 
human activities are causing global warming. But we wouldn’t want it to generalise 
in this way, because some people don’t know this. Some people don’t know it 
because they don’t believe it. Some people don’t know it because, even though 
they believe it, they believe it on the basis of weak or possibly no evidence.19 There 
would only be a problem if there were subjects who believe it on the basis of 
evidence we would regard as strong enough for knowledge, but aren’t practically 
certain. Are there such subjects? I’m not sure. In any case, if it turns out that, on 
Fassio’s account, some subjects don’t know that human activities are causing 
global warming because of how they would (rationally) respond to the stakes in 
counterfactual scenarios, then this could be the basis of an objection to Fassio’s 
account of knowledge. But it isn’t clear that the objection would have anything to 
do with the skeptical aspect of his account. The objection would rather be that it 
just doesn’t seem like how you would respond to the stakes in counterfactual 
scenarios should make a difference to whether you know these things. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper started in a rather unpromising way. I noted that it is a desideratum on 
any account of knowledge that it accommodate the fact—and I think it is a fact—
that we know quite a lot of things. But, while this rules out radical forms of 
skeptical invariantism, it doesn’t automatically rule out more moderate forms. I 
have proposed a list of things I think any account of knowledge should say that we 
know, and considered whether Fassio’s moderate skeptical invariantist account can 
accommodate them. I have argued that the answer is a qualified “yes”. While 
Fassio focuses on showing that his view can accommodate some perceptual, 
memorial and testimonial beliefs, I have argued that his account accommodates 
certain introspective beliefs, beliefs in a priori, analytic or necessary truths and, 
finally, certain scientific beliefs. This is in no way a “complete” defence of 
 
19 For an empirically informed discussion of this see McKenna (2019). 
17 
 
moderate skeptical invariantism, or Fassio’s specific version of it. But I hope I have 
succeeded in showing that it is plausible to hold that, even though we know a fair 
bit, we know quite a lot less than we ordinarily take ourselves to know.20 
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